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C
ouncil
housing is still
some way
from reaching its
centenary, accepting
that it was the 1919
Housing and Planning
Act that initiated the
first major council
house building
programme. Yet it is
quite feasible that
council housing, in
England at least, will disappear by 2020
(Malpass and Mullins, 2002), or perhaps
even earlier if more recent, post-1988
housing policy initiatives continue to
impact on council housing in the way that
they have in recent years.
This article sets out to review the
reasons for the post-1988 changes, and
their impact in the Yorkshire and Humber
region, before considering some of the
issues that continue to hang over the
future of what remains of council housing.
De-municipalization
of social housing
As recently as 1980, council housing
reached its zenith with around six million
council tenancies and which accounted
for nearly one third of homes within
England (Malpass, 2000). Since then,
and in every successive year, the number
of council homes has been in both
relative and absolute decline. In 1970,
councils were still producing a total of
172,000 new council homes (LGiU, 2004),
but since the early 1980s council house
building has all but ended.
The introduction of the ‘Right to Buy’, in
the 1980 Housing Act, accounted for the
transfer into owner-occupation of more
than 2.5 million homes (LGiU, 2004). But,
since 1988, the whole scale transfer of
entire housing stocks or on other
occasions, the transfer of large estates,
has seen the further de-municipalization
of large swathes of council housing to the
housing association sector.
Finally, recent years have also seen the
development of ‘arms-length companies’
to oversee the management of much of
the remaining areas of council housing.
Having successfully implemented and
seen a large scale take up of their Right
to Buy policies in the early 1980s, the
Conservatives had by the mid-1980s
moved onto considering the wider
eradication of council housing as a
principle form of housing provision.
The response to what became the 1989
Local Government and Housing Act was
a major influence on policy development
at the local level. In 1988, Chiltern District
Council became the first local authority to
transfer its entire housing stock to a new
landlord.
Large scale voluntary transfer
At the end of 1991, some 16 councils had
followed the route of what became known
as ‘large scale voluntary transfer’ (LSVT),
all of which were rural or semi-rural
district councils and generally located in
the south of England — but with one
notable exception. Ryedale District
Council broke the mould in becoming
the first northern local authority to transfer
its housing, establishing a new housing
association (Ryedale Housing
Association) to receive its 3,353 homes, at
a transfer value of £28.3million.
The development of LSVT has been
seen as a local initiative initially but
which, by 1992, had become
mainstreamed into central government
policy with the establishment of an
annual transfer programme and detailed
procedural guidelines and advice.
Nevertheless, the period up to the
Labour Government coming to power in
1997 led to a continuing scepticism about
the process, whilst many larger, urban
authorities held on to see if a new political
regime would support stock retention.
The obvious reticence about council
housing and indeed, the continuing
support for de-municipalization from the
incoming Labour Government, saw an
increased acceptance of LSVT as a local
policy ‘choice’, this time impacting more
noticeably in the Midlands and the North.
By 2003, transfers had been completed in
major urban areas such as Coventry,
Sunderland and Walsall, as well as more
locally in Bradford.
By May 2005, there had been some 146
completed stock transfers (House of
Commons Council Housing Group, 2005)
with another 40 considering transfer. In
addition to Ryedale and Bradford, this
region had also seen whole stock
transfers take place in Hambleton,
Calderdale, Craven, Scarborough and,
most recently, Wakefield.
But the requirement for a tenant vote,
and the need for a clear majority of those
voting, has meant that the process has
not always gone smoothly. There have
been significant ‘No’ votes, with the
largest and the greatest impact being that
in Birmingham in 2002. This vote
produced a temporary hiatus with many
LSVT proposals. In this region, Harrogate
remains the only negative vote.
ALMOs
Under some internal party pressure to
offer an alternative to LSVT, New Labour
did introduce the arms-length
management organisation (ALMO)
option. Here the Government (potentially)
made additional capital allocations
available to a landlord council, but with
the linked conditions of the arms-length
constitution, essentially requiring the
creation of a new local authority-
controlled company and the necessity to
achieve a 2* ‘likely-to-improve’ Housing
Inspectorate rating before any of these
additional funds could be drawn down.
Nevertheless, ALMOs have proved
attractive to some local authorities as they
offer extra funding without the need for
transferring ownership. Twenty mainly
larger urban councils had established
ALMOs by the end of 2002/03, rising to
44 by May 2005.
In this region, Leeds, Kirklees and
Barnsley established ALMOs but again,
as with LSVT, the new ALMOs have not
progressed without problems.
Achieving the necessary 2* rating has
also proven problematic. A number of the
six new Leeds ALMOs took more than
one attempt to gain the grade and other
ALMOs such as at Salford and Bassetlaw
have struggled to progress beyond 1*
and so have not been able to access the
additional ALMO funding.
Achieving decent homes
In 2000, the Government set out in its
Green Paper, Quality and Choice: A
Decent Home for All (DETR 2000a), its
proposals for raising the quality of social
housing and providing social tenants with
a ‘decent home’. These proposals were
further confirmed in Quality and Choice:
The de-municipalization
of social housing:
changing the regional map
Council housing is being transformed by a mix of policy processes, such that it
is highly likely that it may no longer exist by the year 2020. This article looks at
the reasons why, and the impact of these processes on the regional policy map.
Eric Summers
Huddersfield
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A Decent Home for All: The Way
Forward (DETR, 2000b).
The initial decent homes standard
(Table 1) has been subject to some
modest review and refinement (ODPM,
2003.
Whilst providing a minimum baseline,
what the decent homes standard
particularly fails to provide for are, in
terms of the individual home,
improvements related to general
insulation (e.g. it does not require the
installation of double glazing or wall
insultation, only loft insulation), home
security, enhanced electrical and related
installations, or modern space standards.
It is certainly not providing a modern day
equivalent of the long since abandoned
‘Parker-Morris’ standard.
More significantly the standard does
not provide any focus at all on the built
form and external environment. As such,
there is little to enhance the living
environment of those residing in low
demand deck access or multi-storey flats,
older sheltered housing, 1970s ‘Radburn-
style’ estates or indeed any of the issues
that significantly impact on the liveability
of some council housing and which
continue to contribute to low demand
problems for many local authorities.
Nor does the standard assist with
problems of accessibility for disabled
people, or in overcoming other
environmental problems not currently
included in ‘fitness’ standards (e.g.
potential for flooding, overhead high
voltage pylons, et cetera).
Realistically, expectations for the
twenty-first century of both landlord and
tenant will often be higher than this
minimum. Even the government
recognises that “most social landlords
aim to have higher standards and do
work to achieve this” (ODPM, 2003 p.20),
confirming the approach that many
councils have taken in seeking to agree
their own localised standard that goes
beyond this minimum.
Nevertheless the challenge in meeting
even this low standard is great. The Green
Paper noted that “past investment in social
housing was not sustained at adequate
levels. The 1996 English House Condition
Survey identified a £10 billion backlog of
disrepair in the local authority housing
sector alone” (DETR, 2000a, p.58). Equally,
at April 2001, there were still 1,200,000 non-
decent council homes (ODPM, 2003,
p.15) and, by November 2002, it was
estimated that there were 100 local
authorities at risk of not meeting the 2010
decent homes target (ODPM, 2003, p.16).
In June 2003, the ODPM outlined to
local authorities the requirement to
undertake a comprehensive option
appraisal to assess the investment needs
of their council housing and to consider
options to ensure that the decent homes
standard could be met. A deadline of July
2005 was set for completion of the
appraisal and for a final ‘sign-off’ by the
relevant Government Office.
Option appraisal
The four principle options that local
authorities were expected to consider
were, in outline:
• transferring the ownership and
management of homes to a housing
association (i.e. LSVT) to enable
freedom to borrow against the asset
base of the transferred stock;
• establishing an ALMO to provide the
housing management service and to
bid for additional funding approvals
from Government, but dependent upon
achieving the minimum 2* rating from
the Audit Commission;
• raising money through a private
finance initiative (PFI) which, in
essence, provides capital investment
via a private company or consortium
and which in turn receives a 30 year
contract and revenue return from the
council; or
• stock retention with the necessary
financing to be achieved from existing
financial resources aided by whatever
level of additional ‘prudential’
borrowing and capital receipts could
be raised.
In addition, a mixed solution utilising
elements of each as appropriate could be
considered and developed.
But underlying this ‘neutral’ option
appraisal process has been a very clear
message from the Government that it
wished to see a “a range of investment
and management measures to bring all
social housing up to a decent standard
by 2010” (DETR, 2000b, p.4) and “a
progressive shift in ownership so that
the stock is more widely owned by a
range of different organisations,
including housing associations, local
housing companies and tenant-led
organisations”(DETR, 2000a, p.17).
More specifically the Government
remained committed to the ideas put
forward in the Green Paper (ODPM,
2000a, p.11) of:
• “supporting the transfer of up to
200,000 homes each year from local
authorities to registered social
landlords, where proposals are
supported by tenants; and
• encouraging the creation of new arms-
length companies to manage local
authority owned housing”.
The key elements that the stock option
appraisal process required were a
review of stock condition, a financial
appraisal and a ‘test of tenant opinion’.
The ODPM guidance indicated that
tenants should be at the centre of
discussions and as part of this, local
authorities were required to appoint an
‘independent tenant adviser’ (ITA) to
assist local tenant’s representatives, and
the wider tenant body, to help them
A IT MEETS THE CURRENT STATUTORY MINIMUM STANDARD FOR HOUSING
Dwellings below this standard are those defined as unfit under section 604 of the Housing Act 1985
(as amended by the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act).
B IT IS IN A REASONABLE STATE OF REPAIR
Dwellings which fail to meet this criterion are those where either:
• one or more of the key building components are old and, because of their condition,
need replacing or major repair; or
• two or more of the other building components are old and, because of their condition,
need replacing or major repair.
C IT HAS REASONABLY MODERN FACILITIES AND SERVICES
Dwellings which fail to meet this criterion are those which lack three or more of the following:
• a reasonably modern kitchen (20 years old or less);
• a kitchen with adequate space and layout;
• a reasonably modern bathroom (30 years old or less);
• an appropriately located bathroom and WC;
• adequate insulation against external noise (where external noise is a problem);
• adequate size and layout of common areas for blocks of flats.
A home lacking two or less of the above is still classed as decent therefore it is not necessary
to modernise kitchens and bathrooms if a home passes the remaining criteria.
D IT PROVIDES A REASONABLE DEGREE OF THERMAL COMFORT
This criterion requires dwellings to have both effective insulation and efficient heating. 
Table 1. The Decent Homes Standard ODPM (2004, p.7)
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receive information and advice on the
process and the issues, this test being, in
part at least, to try to avoid the
unexpected negative response that was
previously seen in Birmingham.
But for many commentators, this
process has seen the continuation of a
illusionary ‘choice’ for tenants, given the
extent to which the alternative options of
LSVT and ALMO provide the only real
means of accessing the required level of
investment that many local authorities
require for their housing stock.
At the centre of the financial problem
for council housing are the public sector
borrowing restrictions, in which capital
spending on social housing is deemed to
be public expenditure, whilst that by
housing associations is not. For a
Chancellor struggling to maintain the
public sector borrowing requirements
(PSBR) within his own targets, housing
has remained a softer target for financial
prudence than that of health or
education, just as it had been with
previous political regimes (Malpass,
2004).
More specifically, for some time and
certainly since the 1989 legislation,
council housing had been financially
managed from the centre as a national
pool in which “council housing might
more accurately be labelled ‘national’
housing” (Audit Commission, 2005, p.1).
Essentially, the housing revenue
account (HRA) operated by local
authorities includes a mechanism which
enables the Government to withdraw
‘notional surpluses’ in rental income from
one local authority and redistribute this to
other areas.
Negative subsidy
In general terms, this produces a shift in
rental income from shire authorities, and
to a lesser extent some urban authorities,
to the London Boroughs and a limited
number outside London. Those housing
authorities making such notional
surpluses are said to be in ‘negative
subsidy’ — a euphemism for cross-
subsidising other authorities who have a
notional deficit.
Overall, 82 per cent of councils,
managing some 63 per cent of council
housing, are in the position of having a
negative subsidy, thereby making
contributions to the national system out of
their rent income (Audit Commission,
2005).
To put this into context, the estimated
HRA ‘subsidy’ for Harrogate Borough
Council for 2005–06 shows a net
withdrawal in real terms of just over £2
million, i.e. around 18 per cent of the
initial total income, or approximately
£9.66 per tenant per week. This is a little
untypical for the Yorkshire and Humber
region overall where the average
contribution is estimated at £3 per week,
but reflects the greater impact of negative
subsidy on shire authorities.
The two principle options available to
councils are either to totally avoid this
financial penalty, by transferring outside
the system (i.e. LSVT), or to reduce the
impact by effectively retaining a greater
proportion of the rent to fund the
additional borrowing permissions
(ALMO). Those councils that choose
stock retention continue to face the
penalty of the HRA subsidy system.
Arguably then, the stock option
process was heavily skewed towards the
further de-municipalization of social
housing which, as we have seen, is a
process that had already been gaining
momentum since the late 1980s.
Current regional
position and the future
Taking the historical position, together
with the current indications from the July
2005 stock option submissions, we can
summarise the current regional position
with regard to the provision of council
housing in Table 2.
In mapping the geographical impact
(Figure 1), the picture is even more
dramatic. Yet perhaps the most
noteworthy point is that, other than those
who are close to or part of the housing
policy arena, this is a step-change that is
rarely identified, acknowledged or
appreciated. Were this scale of
transformation to have taken place in the
education or health field there can be
little doubt that the public debate would
have been greater, which in itself reflects
the position of council housing vis-à-vis
the welfare state (Malpass, 2004).
For some, the process of de-
municipalization changes represent a
major challenge for the defence of
council housing (see
www.defendcouncilhousing.org.uk), but
increasingly this seems to be a cry in the
wilderness. We are now into the third
successive Labour Government, and
there have been twice as many council
homes subject to transfer in the eight
years of labour control than the
corresponding period under the
Conservatives (NHF, Nov 2005).
For others, it is argued that the time has
come for the remaining council housing
stock to face compulsory transfer, rather
than continue this illusory choice process
and for the Government to continue to
oversee an increasingly ‘rump’ council
housing sector (Zitron, 2004).
There remains however a number of
issues and concerns about where the
process has currently taken housing
policy, and what this implies for the future.
Firstly, the current processes and
mechanisms for either transfer or the
establishment of an ALMO are costly and
remain uncertain in the light of a potential
tenant veto. The typical cost of transfer is
in the order of £3–4 million whilst even
creating an ALMO can be as much as
£1.5 million. There seems to have been
little progress in gaining cost efficiencies
within what should by now be a tried and
tested administrative process and the
Figure 1. Provision of housing by local authority area
LSVT – completed
or in process
ALMO – established
or proposed
Stock retention at present
EAST RIDING OF YORKSHIRE
RYEDALE
HAMBLETON
RICHMONDSHIRE
CRAVEN
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Reproduced from Ordnance Survey material with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of the Controller
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may lead to prosecution or civil proceedings. Licensee: Housing Corporation Licence No 100042275 © 2005
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processes remain quite unwieldy.
Secondly, and most specifically, there
is a remaining issue about those councils
that do not choose ALMO status yet are
quite clearly a high performing council
(such as LB Camden which is now at 3*)
but are still unable to access additional
funding. As noted earlier there remain a
number of ALMOs that may yet struggle
to achieve 2*. Even where ALMOs do
progress, some of the financial pressures
on the housing revenue account can still
remain, as indicated by Leeds Council
seeking to merge a number of its current
six ALMOs, even though they were only
created less than three years ago.
A much greater issue for ALMOs is
what there long-term future and standing
is going to be beyond the current life
expectancy of 2010. The matter is clearly
vexing the Government policy-makers as
an ODPM report on the future of ALMOs
has been significantly delayed and, at the
time of writing, is still awaited. It seems
highly unlikely that either the Government
or the ALMOs will wish to reintegrate
back into the council post 2010. Again,
for critics such as Defend Council
Housing, ALMOs are then seen as a
mere staging-post to eventual transfer.
More centrally is the question
remaining over the national housing
revenue ‘pool’. Current policies in favour
of transfer are clearly pointing towards a
crisis if this results in a reduction of the
cross-subsidisation that currently exists,
as more ‘negative subsidy’ LAs transfer
out of the system.
Then there is the question of what
transfer, and to a lesser extent ALMOs,
means in terms of local accountability.
On one hand, the constitutional
arrangements for both LSVT and ALMOs
bring tenants onto the board of
management and therefore into the
formal decision-making arena which then
has the potential to enhance
accountability in a way that the council
democracy does not.
The counter view notes increasing
evidence of the rationalisation of the
housing association sector, with further
mergers and formalised alliances, which
may over time serve to reduce localised
accountability in favour of managerial
and organisational efficiency and
strategic growth. Within this region the
incorporation of the former Ryedale and
Craven housing stock into a wider
housing association group structure
presents such challenges.
Then there are the challenges that face
the transferring housing authority in
terms of continuing to provide for its
residual housing functions post-transfer
(i.e. mainly homelessness and housing
strategy work) without a substantial
housing department and a core of
professional housing staff. This is clearly
much more of an issue for the smaller
shire authorities with limited numbers of
personnel where they are struggling to
retain an organisational ‘critical mass’.
Conclusion
This article provides a review of specific
policy progress within the council
housing sector, reflecting upon change
nationally and more directly on its
regional impact. The direction of change
is undeniable, but what remain much
less clear are the longer-term
implications for several wider
Governmental agendas. What will these
processes eventually achieve in terms of
either the quality or the quantity of
affordable and accessible housing for all
sectors of our society? And what might it
mean for the future of local government
at a time when Ministers are looking for
“a focus on the neighbourhood level”
(Miliband, 2005)
Perhaps most importantly, what does
this transformation of the social housing
sector imply for the remainder of the
welfare state? Does this example provide
a road-map for a “new settlement of the
welfare state” (Malpass, 2004, p. 224).
For a policy area that remains largely
outside the radar of the general public,
public housing policy may yet prove to
be a litmus test for many of the policy
LSVT (& DATE)
APPROX. STOCK AT
POINT OF TRANSFER
(VARIOUS SOURCES)
TO
Ryedale BC (1991) 3,353
Ryedale HA
(now part of Yorkshire Housing Group)
Hambleton (1993) 4,242 Broadacres HA
Calderdale MDC (2000) 13,220 Pennine Housing 2000
Craven DC (2003) 1,600
Craven Housing
(part of Yorkshire Housing Group)
Bradford CC (2003) 25,550 Bradford and District Housing Trust
Scarborough (2004) 4,700 Yorkshire Coast Homes
Wakefield MDC (2005) 33,000 Wakefield and District HA
North East Lincolnshire DC (2005) 8,700 Shoreline HA
Selby DC (proposed) 3,080 Town & Village HA
Sheffield (proposed – part transfer) 3,325 Not determined
North Lincolnshire DC (proposed) 10,150 North Lincolnshire Homes
ALMO
STOCK NUMBERS
(ODPM 2005)
TO
Kirklees MDC 24,484 Kirklees Neighbourhood Housing
Leeds CC 61,823 Leeds NE Homes
Leeds SE Homes
Leeds W Homes
Leeds S Homes
Leeds NW Homes
Leeds SW Homes
Barnsley 20,816 Berneslai Homes
Doncaster 22,509 St Leger Homes
Rotherham 22,460 2010 Rotherham
Sheffield (part only)* 52,740 Sheffield Homes*
STOCK RETENTION STRATEGIES
STOCK NUMBERS
(ODPM 2005)
TO
East Riding 11,515 -
Harrogate 3,909 -
Hull 29,888 -
Richmondshire 1,672 -
York 8,150 -
* Sheffield total stock listed here. As a ‘mixed solution’, only a proportion are proposed to pass over to the new ALMO.
Table 2. Current regional position for local housing authorities
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T
he Design for
Manufacture
Competition,
which was announced
in the spring of 2005,
was not without its
critics. The
competition was
challenged largely for
its use of design
codes which, in turn,
have been criticised
because of their potential to restrict
freedom of architectural design.
The competition, however, captured
the imagination of many and proved that
it is possible to construct a three bed
family home for less than £60,000. With
six of the nine stage-two winners
allocated land and the first builds due to
commence early this year, the true results
of the competition are yet to be realised.
The competition itself was conceived
in part as a bid to tackle build cost
inflation, by promoting the use of modern
methods of construction (MMC). As skill
shortages and high demand for
traditional labour in the construction
industry continue to drive up costs, a
focus on MMC and a shift towards off-
site construction has the potential to
bring down development costs for many
home builders.
Even with the £60,000 being set to
cover build cost only and not including
additional costs such as land purchase
and remediation, developers have
achieved significant savings which may
go some way to achieving the aim of
tackling build cost inflation.
Who saves what?
The next steps must surely revolve
around examining how developers are
able to pass some of those savings on to
home buyers. By encouraging or
enabling developers to do so, the
benefits of the Deputy Prime Minister’s
competition may be brought forward to
marry with broader national and regional
agendas such as the Northern Way
initiative and at a more local level, within
the sub-regional Housing Market
Renewal Pathfinders (HMRP). There is a
clear link to be developed here, between
driving down development costs and the
affordable housing agenda.
Evidently, the existing system of using
Section 106 to encourage private
developers to include affordable housing
in otherwise market-led developments is
not without its limitations. It is through
section 106 and through control over the
planning system that local authorities are
able to deliver affordable housing.
In a recent report, the National Audit
Office and the Audit Commission (2005)
identified a number of recommendations
aimed at improving increasing supply of
affordable housing through the Section
106 route. These included addressing the
variation between local authorities in time
taken to settle 106 agreements (between
60 and 13 weeks according to the
report), and suggesting that developers
must familiarise themselves with the
varying approaches to affordable housing
adopted by different local authorities, the
latter bestowing responsibility on the part
of developers themselves in terms of
taking the initiative in presenting
acceptable proposals for affordable
housing.
A lack of affordability is clearly
exacerbated by a thriving housing
market. The Barker report (Barker, 2004)
outlined the need to build more homes in
response to the pressures of supply and
demand, but it will be some considerable
time (if ever) before increasing the
supply of housing pushes overall prices
to within the reach of newly qualified
nurses, teachers and other professions
which have historically enabled access to
the property ladder. Affordable housing
and enabling access to a rising market,
in the mean time, revolves around the
promotion of a range of ‘low cost home
ownership’ (LCHO) schemes and the
courting of the so-called ‘intermediate
The £60k home:
building to a price
that people can afford
The promotion of home ownership as a tenure of choice appears to be rising up
the Government’s agenda. This article highlights the Deputy Prime Minister’s
Design for Manufacture Competition (the £60,000 house) and its potential as a
tool to further home ownership, drawing attention to the need to develop new
business models and practices as a means of enhancing the efficacy of the
competition.
Josh Sutton
Northern Edge
debates that are yet to be held.
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